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Buzhardt: Personal Property

PERSONAL PROPERTY
J. FRED BUZHARDT, JR.'
The personal property cases decided by the Supreme Court
during the past year were few and established no new precedents.
In Hawkins v. Thackston,1 the Court was faced with the
question of title to a deposit in a savings and loan association.
The deposit was made with funds of one W. C. Hawkins, the
account being listed in the pass-book, "W. C. Hawkins or Miss
Susan Hawkins", the latter being a niece of the former. Upon
the death of W. C. Hawkins, this action was brought seeking
a declaratory judgment that the deposit belonged to the niece.
The Court, drawing support from the joint deposit statutes, 2
found that the niece had title to the deposit because of the
third party beneficiary contract with the association, although
the same result could not be justified as a gift inter vivos nor
causa mortis.
The subject of inter vivos gifts was before the Court in
Smith v. Johnson,8 and, as in the majority of the decisions
on gifts, the controversy centered around the essential element of delivery. Two chattels were the subjects of the alleged
gift, one of which, it appeared, was delivered by the donor
to the donee several months subsequent to the words of donation, and the other was retained in possession of the donor
until his death. The latter, the Court held, had not been the
subject of a gift as a matter of law for lack of delivery, but
that there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury as to title
of the former, since it is not essential to a gift inter vivos
that the delivery of the chattel be simultaneous with the words
of donation.

*Member of the firm of Buzhardt & Buzhardt, McCormick, S. C.;
LL.B., 1952, University of South Carolina.
1. 224 S.C. 445, 79 S.E. 2d 714 (1954).
2. CODE or LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 8-171, 8-602.
3. 223 S.C. 64, 74 S.E. 2d 419 (1953).
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